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Stability against potential deviations by sets of agents is a most desired property in
the design and analysis of multi-agent systems. However, unfortunately, this property is
typically not satisﬁed. In game-theoretic terms, a strong equilibrium, which is a strategy
proﬁle immune to deviations by coalition, rarely exists. This paper suggests the use of
mediators in order to enrich the set of situations where we can obtain stability against
deviations by coalitions. A mediator is deﬁned to be a reliable entity, which can ask
the agents for the right to play on their behalf, and is guaranteed to behave in a pre-
speciﬁed way based on messages received from the agents. However, a mediator cannot
enforce behavior; that is, agents can play in the game directly, without the mediator’s
help. A mediator generates a new game for the players, the mediated game. We prove
some general results about mediators, and mainly concentrate on the notion of strong
mediated equilibrium, which is just a strong equilibrium at the mediated game. We show
that desired behaviors, which are stable against deviations by coalitions, can be obtained
using mediators in several classes of settings.
© 2008 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
When considering a prescribed behavior in a multi-agent system, it makes little sense to assume that an agent will
stick to its part of that behavior, if deviating from it can increase its payoff. This leads to much interest in the study of
Nash equilibrium in games. When agents are allowed to use mixed strategies, Nash equilibrium always exists. However,
Nash equilibrium does not take into account deviations by non-singleton sets of agents. While stability against deviations
by subsets of the agents, captured by the notion of strong equilibrium [4], is a most natural requirement, it is well known
that obtaining such stability is possible only in rare situations.1
In order to tackle this issue we consider in this paper the use of mediators. A mediator is a reliable entity that can interact
with the players and perform on their behalf actions in a given game. However, a mediator cannot enforce behavior. Indeed,
an agent is free to participate in the game without the help of the mediator. This notion is highly natural in a setting in
which there exists some form of reliable party or administrator that is ready to serve as a mediator. For example, when
Ebay is offering proxy services, it actually acts as a mediator and not only as an organizer. Notice that we assume that the
multi-agent interaction formalized as a game is given, and that all the mediator can do is to communicate with the agents
✩ An extended abstract of this paper appears in the proceedings of the Twenty-First National Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AAAI-06). Almost all
proofs are missing from the extended abstract. This version of the paper contains all of these missing proofs, and provides additional discussion and results.
Furthermore, some of the deﬁnitions that appear in the extended abstract have been slightly modiﬁed. This work has been partially supported by the Israel
Science Foundations (ISF).
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address:moshet@ie.technion.ac.il (M. Tennenholtz).
1 For example, in the context of congestion games, Holzman and Law-Yone [13] characterized the networks where strong equilibrium always exist. They
showed that strong equilibrium is guaranteed only in a very restricted type of networks.0004-3702/$ – see front matter © 2008 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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the messages received from all agents. This natural setting is different from the one discussed in the theory of mechanism
design, where a designer designs a new game from scratch in order to yield some desired behavior.
Indeed, many markets employ very powerful forms of mediators like brokers, or routers in communication networks.2 We
ﬁnd the notion of a mediator as central to the study of multi-agent systems. Indeed, while in economic theory, the dominant
theme is that rational agents are to behave independently without any interference of a mediator, the (either explicit or
implicit) existence of a party that provides suggestions, protocols, and rules of behavior has always been fundamental in the
AI context of multi-agent systems (see [9,25] for some early introductions). As a result, in this paper we develop a rigorous
study of mediators, aiming at the study of their use in establishing stability against deviations by coalitions.
A mediator for a given game is deﬁned by sets of messages, one set for each player, and by an action function deﬁned
on vectors of messages; when a player sends a message to the mediator she gives the right to play to the mediator who
will choose an action on her behalf (possibly by randomization) by applying the action function to the vector of messages
sent to him. However, the mediator cannot enforce the players to use his services. The mediator generates a new game
for the players, which we call the mediated game. In this game every player can either send a message to the mediator or
play without the mediator. The outcome generated in the given game by an equilibrium in the mediated game is called
a mediated equilibrium. An outcome generated by a strong equilibrium at the mediated game is called a strong mediated
equilibrium. In an extreme case the message space of each player is a singleton. That is, this mediator accepts only one
possible message: “I give you the right to play on my behalf”. Such a mediator is called a minimal mediator. An important
mediator is the one already developed in [32], where the set of messages of each player is the set of possible programs
in a given programming language; in this case the action function is the one that executes the programs. Hence, program
equilibrium is a particular type of mediated equilibrium. We further discuss the connections between mediators and the
notion of program equilibrium in Section 10. In this paper we concentrate on the notion of strong mediated equilibrium.
In order to illustrate the power of a reliable mediators as discussed in this paper, consider the following simple example:
In this classical Prisoners’ dilemma game we get that in the unique equilibrium both agents will defect, yielding both of
them a payoff of 1. However, this equilibrium, which is also a dominant strategy equilibrium, is ineﬃcient; indeed, if both
agents deviate from defection to cooperation then both of them will improve their payoffs. Formally, mutual defection is
not a strong equilibrium.
Consider a reliable minimal mediator who offers the agents the following action function: if both agents give the media-
tor the right to play, he will perform cooperate on behalf of both agents. However, if only one agent agrees to give the right
to play, the mediator he will perform defect on behalf of that agent. Hence, the mediator generates the following mediated
game:
2 One interesting type of such markets is that of lottery syndicates. A lottery syndicate coordinates agents’ activities in a lottery by trying to optimize
the participants’ joint actions. Such syndicates are known to be successful in the UK. It seems, however, that they are considered illegal at the US.
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stable against deviations by coalitions. In this equilibrium both agents will give the mediator the right to play, which will
lead them to a payoff of 4 each! Hence, cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma game is a strong mediated equilibrium.
In Sections 3 and 4 we explore general properties of mediators. Given the general concept of a mediator, we prove that
mediators can indeed signiﬁcantly increase the set of multi-agent encounters in which desired outcomes, which are stable
against deviations by coalitions, can be obtained. We ﬁrst prove that every two-person game possesses a strong mediated
equilibrium, which also leads to optimal surplus. For general n-person games we prove that every balanced symmetric game
possesses a strong mediated equilibrium, which also leads to optimal surplus. The precise deﬁnition of a balanced game is
given in Section 7.1.3 On an intuitive level, a game is balanced if there exists a proﬁle of strategies yielding a payoff vector
with the property that for each coalition of players their aggregate payoffs in this vector is at least as high as the aggregate
payoff they can grantee themselves in the game by using a correlated strategy. For example, the Prisoner’s Dilemma game
discussed above is a balanced game. The proﬁle of strategies (c, c) yields the payoff vector (4,4); No player can guarantees
herself more than 4, and the coalition of the two players cannot guarantee itself more than 8.
In between equilibrium and strong equilibrium one can naturally deﬁne k-strong equilibrium as an outcome, which is
immune to deviations of coalitions of size at most k. Indeed, if one considers the distributed computing and cryptography
literature, it typically requires stability against deviations by up to k (typically faulty or malicious) agents, which can be
viewed as a particular form of game-theoretic stability [17]. Similarly, we deﬁne the notion of k-strong mediated equilibrium.
We show that in every symmetric game with n agents, if k! divides n there exists a k-strong mediated equilibrium, leading
to optimal surplus.4
We concentrate in this paper on the study of mediators within the classical NTU (non-transferable utility) model; how-
ever, we also extend our study, to a restricted case of the TU (transferable utility) model via the concept of an aggregate
mediated equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, deviations which include re-distribution of payments, are taken into account.
In fact, part of our study of strong aggregate mediated equilibrium serves as a technical tool for establishing the above
mentioned results on the existence of strong mediated equilibrium in the NTU setting.
Finally, we want to report about two recent developments in the theory of mediators, which occurred after the publi-
cation of an extended abstract of this paper in the Twenty-First National Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AAAI-06). In
[27] the concept of mediator has been generalized to allow it to condition its choices on the realizations of the actions of
the players who do not use its services. Such a mediator is natural in routing systems, and has much more power than the
mediator introduced in this paper. A mediator for games with incomplete information has been deﬁned and analyzed in [3],
where as an application the authors construct mediators for position auctions.5
We end this introduction with a discussion of a related literature.
A non-strategic model of mediation was introduced in [4] via the concept of c-acceptable strategies. This is an abstract
notion that captures the “reasonable outcomes” obtained when subsets of the set of agents can correlate their activities.
Our work introduces an explicit model of the mediation activity. In Section 5 we show that the introduction of an explicit
mediator makes a difference; the outcomes that can be obtained using strong mediated equilibria constitute a subset of the
set of outcomes that can be obtained using c-acceptable strategies.
The simplest form of mediator discussed in the game theory literature is captured by the notion of correlated equilib-
rium [6]. Indeed, since mediation via correlation device makes perfect sense from the CS/AI perspective, where protocols
are typically recommended to the participants, this topic got considerable attention in the CS literature (e.g., [14,23]). This
notion was generalized to communication equilibrium by [11,21]. Another, more powerful type of mediators is discussed
in [19]. However, in all these settings the mediator can not perform actions on behalf of the agents that allow it to do so.
Situations where mediators can act on behalf of agents were discussed in the literature (see, e.g., [15]). However, these
studies concentrated on 2-person games, and the central issue of stability against deviations by coalitions was not discussed
in that literature. Mediators were also discussed in some restricted settings, under different titles; one interesting example
is the study of bidding rings in auctions (see, e.g., [7,12,18]); here the bidding ring organizer can be viewed as a form of a
mediator. A recent paper [31] implicitly discusses mediators via the notion of commitment – a commitment device serves
as a mediator. This paper deals only with equilibrium (in contrast to strong equilibrium).
2. Games in strategic form: Strong equilibrium
Some notational preliminaries are needed. Let Y be a nonempty ﬁnite set. The set of probability distributions over Y
is denoted by Δ(Y ). That is, every c ∈ Δ(Y ) is a function c : Y → [0,1] such that ∑y∈Y c(y) = 1. For every y ∈ Y we
denote by δy the probability distribution that assigns probability 1 to y. Let I be a nonempty ﬁnite set of indices, and let
ci ∈ Δ(Yi), i ∈ I , where Yi is a nonempty ﬁnite set for every i ∈ I . We denote by ×i∈I ci the product probability distribution
on Y= ×i∈I Y i that assigns to every y ∈ Y the probability ∏i∈I ci(yi).
3 As explained in Section 7.1 the title “balanced” is inherited from cooperative game theory.
4 As an anecdote, the parliament in Israel contains 120 = 5! members. Hence, every anonymous game played by this Parliament possesses an optimal
surplus symmetric 5-strong mediated equilibrium. While no parliament member is able to give the right of voting to a mediator, this right of voting may
be replaced in real life by a commitment to follow the mediator’s algorithm.
5 That is, auctions similar to the ones used by Google to sell ads. See e.g., [33].
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nonempty strategy set of player i, and ui : X→R is the payoff function for player i, where X= ×i∈N Xi . If |N| = n, whenever
convenient we assume N = {1, . . . ,n}. Γ is ﬁnite if the strategy sets are ﬁnite. A nonempty subset of the players is also called
a coalition.
Let Γ = 〈N, (Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N 〉 be a ﬁnite game. For every coalition S we denote XS = ×i∈S Xi . Note that XN = X and
X{i} = Xi . When the set N is clear, we will denote the complement of S in N by Sc or by −S . Thus, XN\S will be also
denoted by XSc or by X−S , and moreover, X−{i} will be also denoted by X−i . Let S ⊆ N be a coalition. Every c ∈ Δ(XS ) is
called a correlated strategy for S . A correlated strategy for the set of all players N is also called a correlated strategy, and for
every i, a correlated strategy for {i} is also called a mixed strategy for i. The expected payoff of i with respect to a correlated





For every S , the set of mixed-strategy proﬁles is denoted by Q S . That is, Q S = ×i∈SΔ(Xi). We will use Q for QN , and Q i
for Q{i} .
The mixed extension of the game Γ is the game (N, (Q i)i∈N , (wi)i∈N), where for every q ∈ Q, wi(q) = Ui(q1 × · · · × qn).
2.1. Three deﬁnitions of strong equilibrium
In general, a strong equilibrium in a game is a proﬁle of strategies with the property that no coalition has a beneﬁcial
deviation for its members. The above verbal deﬁnition leaves a lot of modeling choices. What is a proﬁle of strategies?
(pure, mixed, or correlated), what is a deviation? (pure, mixed or correlated), and what is the meaning of “beneﬁcial for its
members”? – is a deviation beneﬁcial only when every member is better off, or is it suﬃcient that some of the members
are better off and the others are not worse off? or maybe it is just required that the aggregate payoffs of the players is
better. Below we will deﬁne three notions of strong equilibrium, and discus their rationale:
Let Γ = 〈N, (Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N 〉 be a game in strategic form.
Deﬁnition 1. Let x ∈ X. x is a strong equilibrium of type I in Γ if the following holds:
For every coalition S , and for every yS ∈ XS there exists j ∈ S such that
u j(yS ,x−S ) u j(x).
Hence, in a strong equilibrium of type I the suggested proﬁle of behavior and the possible proﬁles of deviations consist
of pure strategies, and a deviation is beneﬁcial to a coalition if it is beneﬁcial to each of its members.
All other deﬁnitions require that the game Γ is ﬁnite because we deﬁned the notion of mixed strategy and correlated
strategy only for ﬁnite games.
Deﬁnition 2. Let q = (q1, . . . ,qn) be a proﬁle of mixed strategies. We say that q is a strong equilibrium of type II in Γ if q is
a strong equilibrium of type I in the mixed extension of Γ .
That is, q is a strong equilibrium of type II in Γ if for every coalition S , and for every proﬁle of mixed strategies (pi)i∈S
there exists j ∈ S such that U j(×i∈S pi ×i∈N\S qi) U j(×i∈N qi). Obviously, if x ∈ X, and (δx1 , . . . , δxn ) is a strong equilibrium
of type II in Γ then x is a strong equilibrium of type I, but the converse does not hold. Whenever (δx1 , . . . , δxn ) is a strong
equilibrium of type II we abuse notations and allow ourselves to say that x is a strong equilibrium of type II in Γ .
Deﬁnition 3. Let q ∈ Q. We say that q is a strong equilibrium of type III, if for every coalition S , and for every correlated
strategy for S , cS ∈ Δ(XS ) there exists j ∈ S such that
U j
(
cS × (×i∈Sc qi)
)
 U j(q1 × q2 × · · · × qn).
Let q ∈ Q. Obviously q is a strong equilibrium of type II if q is a strong equilibrium of type III, but not vice versa.
The requirement that q is a strong equilibrium of type II seems to be acceptable in an environment in which the players
believe that they and others could not possibly correlate their behavior (e.g., when every player is sitting in a separate
room, and there is no communication between the players). However, every player can perform a private randomization.
In an environment in which the players do not correlate their strategies, but they may fear/hope that such a correlation is
possible, we expect q to be a strong equilibrium of type III in order to be believed/played by the players. At Section 7 we
deﬁne a fourth notion of strong equilibrium.
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We now introduce mediators, a general tool for coordinating and inﬂuencing agents’ behavior in games. A mediator is
always assumed to be reliable. However, mediators are classiﬁed according to their abilities to interfere in the game.
In this paper we endow the mediator with the ability to play for the players who give him the right to play for them.
However, the mediator cannot enforce the players to use his services.
Deﬁnition 4. Let Γ be a ﬁnite game in strategic form. A mediator for Γ is a tuple ((Mi)i∈N , c= (cS )∅	=S⊆N ), where each Mi
is a ﬁnite set, Mi ∩ Xi = ∅ for every player i, and for every coalition S , cS :MS → Δ(XS ).
In the above deﬁnition Mi is a set of messages that may be sent by agent i to the mediator. Agent i may either participate
in the game directly or participate in the game using the mediator’s services by sending him any message from Mi . The
action function of the mediator is c = (cS )∅	=S⊆N ; If the set of players that send messages to the mediator is S , and the
members of S send the vector of messages mS = (mi)i∈S , the mediator plays in behalf of the members of S the correlated
strategy for S , cS (ms). That is, the mediator chooses a proﬁle of strategies xS according to the probability distribution
cS(mS ), and plays xi on behalf of every player i ∈ S .
Every mediator M for Γ deﬁnes a ﬁnite game in strategic form, which we call the mediated game and denote by Γ (M).
In the mediated game, the strategy set of player i is Zi = Xi ∪ Mi , and the payoff function of i is deﬁned for every z ∈ Z as
follows:
uMi (z) = Ui
(
cTz(zTz ) × (× j∈N\Tzδz j )
)
,
where Tz = { j ∈ N | z j ∈ M j}. That is, Tz is the set of players who use the service of the mediator.6
Deﬁnition 5. Let Γ be a game in strategic form. A correlated strategy c ∈ Δ(X) is a strong mediated equilibrium if there exists
a mediator for Γ , M, and a vector of messages m ∈ M = ×i∈NMi , with cN (m) = c, such that m is a strong equilibrium of
type III in Γ (M); Such a mediator is said to strongly implement c.
We now deﬁne a type of minimal mediators that will play an important role in our subsequent analysis.
Deﬁnition 6. Let Γ be a game in strategic form. A mediator M = ((Mi)i∈N , (cS )∅	=S⊆N ) is minimal if each message space is
a singleton.
Consider a minimal mediator in which Mi = {ri} for every player i. Let r = (r1, . . . , rn). When the players are using this
mediator each of them can either give the right to play to the mediator (sending ri) or play independently. If the coalition
that gives the right to play is T , the mediator uses the correlated strategy cT = cT (rT ) in order to play for T . Hence, every
minimal mediator is uniquely deﬁned by a vector of correlated strategies, (cS )∅	=S⊆N , one for each coalition. This minimal
mediator strongly implements c if r is a strong mediated equilibrium at the mediated game and cN = c. As it turns out,
restricting our attention to minimal mediators does not cause any loss of strong mediated equilibria:
Lemma 1. Let Γ be a ﬁnite game in strategic form. Every strongmediated equilibrium in Γ can be implemented by aminimal mediator.
Proof. Let c ∈ Δ(X) be a strong mediated equilibrium, and let M = ((Mi)i∈N , (cS )∅	=S⊆N ) implement c by the proﬁle m ∈M.
That is, m is a strong equilibrium of type III in Γ (M), and cN(m) = c. Deﬁne a minimal mediator, K, in which the set of
messages for every i is Ki = {mi}. The implementing functions are for every coalition S the restriction of cS to {mS }. That is,
the minimal mediator is K = (cS (mS ))∅	=S⊆N . Hence, Γ (K) is obtained from Γ (M) by restricting the strategy set of every
player i from Xi ∪ Mi to Xi ∪ {mi}. Therefore, m remains a strong equilibrium of type III in Γ (K). 
4. Properties of strong mediated equilibria
For further analysis it is convenient to notice the following properties of mediators.






ξ(xS ,m−S )c−S (m−S )(x−S ). (1)
6 If Tz = ∅ the symbol cTz (zTz ) is not deﬁned. However, here and in other cases the meaning of such expressions is obvious, and we skip their details
for ease of exposition since they can be easily understood by the reader. Here, of course, if Tz = ∅, uMi (z) = Ui(× j∈Nδz j ) = ui(z). Similarly, if Tz = N ,
uMi (z) = cN (z).




ξ(xS , r−S )c−S (x−S ). (2)
Hence, in the mediated game:
UMi (ξ) = Ui(cξ ). (3)
Similarly, for every coalition T , every ξT ∈ Δ(ZT ) deﬁne cξT ∈ Δ(XT ) as follows:





ξT (xA,mT \A)cT \A(mT \A)(xT \A), xT ∈ XT . (4)
And for a minimal mediator:
cξT (xT ) =
∑
A⊆T
ξT (xA, rT \A)cT \A(xT \A), xT ∈ XT . (5)
The next proposition shows that by using mediators we don’t lose any outcome that can be obtained in a strong equi-
librium of the original game:
Proposition 1. Let Γ be a ﬁnite game in strategic form, and let q be a proﬁle of mixed strategies, which is a strong equilibrium of
type III in Γ . Then, q1 × q2 × · · · × qn is a strong mediated equilibrium in Γ .
Proof. We deﬁne a minimal mediator M = (cS)∅	=S⊆N as follows: cS = ×i∈Sqi for every coalition S ⊆ N . Let T be a coalition
and let ξT ∈ Δ(ZT ). We have to show that ξT is not a proﬁtable deviation for its members. Let ξ = ξT × (×i∈N\T δri ) ∈ Δ(Z).
We have to show that there exists i ∈ T for which
UMi (ξ) uMi (r1, r2, . . . , rn).
That is,
Ui(cξ ) Ui(q1 × q2 × · · · × qn). (6)
We will show that
cξ = cξT × c−T . (7)
Because q is a strong equilibrium of type III in Γ and c−T = × j∈N\T q j , (7) implies that there exists i ∈ T for which (6)
holds.
In order to prove (7) note that for every z ∈ Z, ξ(z) = 0 unless z−T = r−T . As the mediator is minimal we get from (2),




ξ(xS , r−S )c−S (x−S ) =
∑
S⊆T
ξT (xS , rT \S)c−S(x−S ).




ξT (xS , rT \S)cT \S(xT \S)
]
c−T (x−T ) = cξT (xT )c−T (x−T ) = (cξT × c−T )(x). 
We next show that a new mediator for the game generated by a mediator cannot add acceptable outcomes. That is, a
mediator can not help in a situation where a mediator is already in place, beyond what can be obtained by the existing
mediator.
Proposition 2. Let Γ be a game in strategic form, and let M = ((Mi)i∈N , (cS )∅	=S⊆N ) be a mediator for Γ . If ξ is a strong mediated
equilibrium in Γ (M), then cξ is a strong mediated equilibrium in Γ .
Proof. Let M′ be a mediator for Γ (M) that implement ξ . By Lemma 1 we can assume that M′ is a minimal mediator,
say M′ = (ξS )∅	=S⊆N , and therefore ξN = ξ . The action of i of giving the right to play to the mediator M′ is denoted by
ri . We deﬁne a minimal mediator for Γ , M∗ = (cξS )∅	=S⊆N . In Γ (M∗) the action of i of giving the right to play to this
mediator is also denoted by ri . We have to show that r = (r1, r2, . . . , rn) is a strong equilibrium of type III in Γ (M∗). Let
T be a coalition, and let ψT be a correlated strategy of T at the game Γ (M∗). Hence, ψT ∈ Δ(×i∈T (Xi ∪ {ri})). Deﬁne
ψˆT ∈ Δ(×i∈T (Xi ∪ Mi ∪ {ri})) as follows: ψˆT is concentrated on ×i∈T (Xi ∪ {ri}), and on this set it is deﬁned as ψT . Let ξ˜ be
the correlated strategy in Γ (M) induced by ψˆT × (×i∈N\T δri ). It is easily veriﬁed that:
ξ˜ (xA,mA) =
∑
ψT (xS , rT \S)ξ−S (xA\S ,m−A).
S⊆A∩T
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cξ˜ = cψT ×(×i∈N\T δri ). (8)
As a deviation to ψˆT is not proﬁtable to its members at the game Γ (M)(M′), there exists a player i ∈ T such that
Ui(cξ˜ ) Ui(cξ ). Therefore, by equality (8), ψT is not a proﬁtable deviation from r at Γ (M∗). 
When deﬁning strong mediated equilibrium we focus on a particular type of pure strategy strong equilibrium of type
III in the mediated game. However, the game generated by the mediator may give rise to other possibilities of forming a
strong equilibrium of type III. It is therefore important to know that our seemingly restricted deﬁnition does not restrict the
possible acceptable outcomes. Indeed, we show:
Proposition 3. Let M = ((Mi)i∈N , (cS)∅	=S⊆N ) be a mediator for Γ , and let qˆ be a vector of mixed strategies in Γ (M), which is a
strong equilibrium of type III in Γ (M). Then cqˆ1×qˆ2×···×qˆn is a strong mediated equilibrium in Γ .
Proof. Because qˆ is a strong equilibrium of type III at Γ (M) then by Proposition 1 qˆ1 × qˆ2 × · · · × qˆn is a strong mediated
equilibrium at Γ (M). Therefore, by Proposition 2, cqˆ1×qˆ2×···×qˆn is a strong mediated equilibrium in Γ . 
Furthermore, when there is one mediator, other mediators may show up. Any set of mediators H = {M1, . . . ,Mk}
generates a game in strategic form Γ (H) in which every player can choose any mediator in H she wishes, and give this
mediator the right to play by sending him a message, or play independently. If ξ is a correlated strategy in Γ (H) we denote
by cξ the correlated strategy in Γ generated by ξ . The next proposition shows that the existence of many mediators that
the agents can approach does not help beyond the use of a single mediator.
Proposition 4. LetH be a set of mediators, and let q¯ be a strong equilibrium of type III in Γ (H), then cq¯1×q¯2×···×q¯n is a strongmediated
equilibrium in Γ .
Proof. One can naturally deﬁne a mediator M which will mimic the strategic possibilities given by the set of mediators:
The message sets in M are just Mi =⋃kj=1 M ji for every i ∈ N . Every message m ∈ MS has the form mS = (mA1 , . . . ,mAk ),
where A j is the set of all players in S that choose a message in M j . Hence, S =⋃kj=1 A j . Deﬁne cS as follows:
cS (mS ) = cA1 (mA1 ) × · · · × cAk (mAk ).
It is obvious that Γ (M) is strategically equivalent to Γ (H), and therefore q¯ is a strong equilibrium of type III at Γ (M).
Therefore, by Proposition 3 cq¯1×q¯2×···×q¯n is a strong mediated equilibrium in Γ . 
5. C-acceptable correlated strategies and strong mediated equilibrium
As mentioned, the main motivation for this work comes from the desire to establish multi-agent behaviors that are
stable against deviations by coalitions, using mediators which can offer their services. Hence, a major point of our study is
in showing that such mediators are indeed helpful. However, when establishing such a theory, it is important to understand
how our study of mediators ﬁts relevant previous foundational work in game theory. Aumann (see [4]) deﬁned c-acceptable
correlated strategies, which may seem at ﬁrst glance to implicitly catch the idea of deﬁning the “reasonable outcomes” that
can be obtained when agents can correlate their strategies.
Deﬁnition 7. A correlated strategy c is c-acceptable if there exists a vector (cS )∅	=S⊆N with cN = c such that for every
coalition S and for every dS ∈ Δ(XS), there exists i ∈ S such that
Ui(dS × c−S) Ui(c).
It is easy to show:
Proposition 5. Every strong mediated equilibrium is c-acceptable.
Proof. Let c be a strong mediated equilibrium. Therefore there exists a minimal mediator, (cS )∅	=S⊆N that implements c. Let
T be a coalition. By Deﬁnition 5, no deviation of T to ξT ∈ Δ(ZT ) is proﬁtable for its members, when T c uses cT c . As XT is
a subset of ZT , it is clear that no deviation of T to cT ∈ Δ(XT ) is proﬁtable for its members. 
However, as we will show, the converse of the above result is not true, for illuminating reasons. One should notice
that all that we used in the above proof was the fact that a strong mediated equilibrium is immune against deviations by
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against correlation over messages and actions. Hence, the converse to Proposition 5 is not clear. Indeed we are about to
prove that the converse is not true. A c-acceptable strategy used by a mediator is not necessary immune against Trojan
horses: A coalition of players may correlate in such a way that in some realizations a subgroup is pretending to cooperate
by sending the right messages. This may be beneﬁcial because these Trojan horses will be part of the punishing group, and
they may get a very big payoff for this!
More precisely, the mediator can only see who has chosen its services, and can not distinguish between an agent that
just asks for its services to one that asks for its services as part of a sophisticated deviation in which it does so only in
particular instances. It turns out that the ability to have such sophisticated deviations, where the mediator can not tell who
are the deviators is indeed meaningful, as captured by the following theorem:
Theorem 1. There exists a game Γ , and a c-acceptable strategy c, which is not a strong mediated equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the following 3-person game:
The strategy set of each player i is {a,b, c}. If Player 3 chooses a the resulting payoff vector is (1,8,0) regardless of the
actions chosen by 1 and 2. Similarly, when 3 chooses b, the resulting payoff is (8,1,0). When 3 chooses c, the resulting
payoff matrix is the 3× 3 matrix in the ﬁgure.
We ﬁrst show that the correlated strategy that is concentrated on (c, c, c) is c-acceptable. We deﬁne a vector (ηS )S⊆{1,2,3} ,
where η{1,2,3} = δ(c,c,c) that satisﬁes the conditions for δ(c,c,c) to be c-acceptable.
As almost all correlated strategies discussed in this example are concentrated on pure strategy proﬁles, we will abuse
notations and for every S and every xS ∈ Δ(XS ) we will identify xS with the correlated strategy δxS
Indeed, let η{1,2} = (a,a), η{1,3} = (a,b), η{2,3} = (a,a), η{3} = a, η{1} = a, and η{2} = a. It is easily checked that these
are punishing strategies that do the job. That is, no deviating group can ensure more than 1 to each of its members. We
proceed to show that (c, c, c) is not a strong mediated equilibrium. Assume for contradiction that it is a strong mediated
equilibrium, and let (cS )S⊂N be a minimal mediator that implements it. In particular, cN = (c, c, c). Consider c{2,3} . Using
this strategy by 2 and 3 must guarantee that player 1 does not get more than 1. Therefore this correlated strategy must
assign a probability 1 to player 3 playing a, since otherwise a deviation of player 1 to (say) a would yield him a strict convex
combination of 8 and 1. Similarly, in c{1,3} player 3 must play b with probability 1. We construct a proﬁtable deviation for
{1,2}. Let 1 and 2 randomize with equal probability between the two options: “1 plays a and 2 give the right of play to
the mediator”, and “2 plays a and 1 give the right of play of the mediator”. Given the properties of η{1,3}, η{2,3} described
above, this deviation will give each of them an expected payoff of 4.5. This contradicts the assumption that (c, c, c) is a
strong mediated equilibrium. Therefore (c, c, c) is not a strong mediated equilibrium. 
5.1. The β-core and the mediated core
We need the following notations: For every correlated strategy c (a strategy proﬁle x) we denote U(c) = (U1(c), . . . ,Un(c))
(u(x) = (u1(x), . . . ,un(x)). A vector w ∈ Rn will be called a payoff vector; w is called a feasible payoff vector for Γ if there
exists a correlated strategy d with U(d) = w. That is, w is feasible if it belongs to the convex hull of all payoff vectors of
the form u(x), x ∈ X. The proof of the following important observation follows directly from the deﬁnition of c-acceptable
strategies and strong mediated equilibrium, respectively:
Observation 1.
1. If c is c-acceptable and U(d) = U(c) then d is also c-acceptable.
2. If c is a strong mediated equilibrium and U(d) = U(c) then d is also a strong mediated equilibrium.
Hence, the question of whether c is a strong mediated equilibrium or c-acceptable depends only on the payoff vector
U(c). Therefore, it is natural to deﬁne the concept of “acceptable” payoff vectors. This was done in [5] for the concept of
“c-acceptable” via the notion of the β-core of a game in strategic form, as follows:
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(w1, . . . ,wn), for which there exists a c-acceptable correlated strategy c such that U(c) = w. That is, wi = Ui(c) for every
i ∈ N .
Similarly, we deﬁne:
Deﬁnition 9. The mediated core of Γ , Cm(Γ ), is the set of all feasible payoff vectors, w, for which there exists a strong
mediated equilibrium c such that w= U(c).
Proposition 5 implies that Cm(Γ ) ⊆ Cβ(Γ ). Considering again the game described in the proof of Theorem 1, as we
showed that (c, c, c) is not a strong mediated equilibrium, then by Part 2 in Observation 1, (1,1,1) = u(c, c, c) is not in the
mediated core. Therefore we have:
Corollary 1. For every game in strategic form, Γ , the mediated core is contained in the β-core. That is,
Cm(Γ ) ⊆ Cβ(Γ ).
Moreover, there exists a game Γ for which a strict inclusion holds.
For completeness, we end this section with an analysis of the mediated core of the game described in Theorem 1.
Actually, it is easy to notice that the correlated strategy, c, which randomizes with equal probabilities between (c, c, c) and
(a,a, c) is a strong mediated equilibrium in Γ , in which 1, and 2 get each 4.5, and 3 gets 0.5. Moreover, the mediated core
of this game is a singleton, that is Cm(Γ ) = {(4.5,4.5,0.5)}.
6. Existence: Two-person games
In this section we illustrate the power of mediators, by showing that every two-person game in strategic form possesses
a strong mediated equilibrium. Other existence results for general classes of games are presented in Sections 8 and 9.
We need some notation: A correlated strategy c is Pareto optimal if for every correlated strategy d there exists i ∈ N such
that Ui(d) Ui(c). A feasible payoff vector, w is Pareto optimal if there exists a Pareto optimal strategy c with U(c) =w.
Obviously Pareto optimality is a necessary condition on c to be a strong mediated equilibrium, as well as to be c-
acceptable. It just says that the set of all players does not have a proﬁtable deviation for its members. Consequently, every
payoff vector in the mediated core or in the β-core is Pareto optimal.
In [5] it was shown that every 2-person game has a c-acceptable strategy. Since the Trojan horse effect, which worked
in the proof of Theorem 1, cannot hold with only two players, we have:
Proposition 6. In a two-person game, every c-acceptable strategy is a strong mediated equilibrium. Consequently, every 2-person
game has a strong mediated equilibrium.
Proof. Let Γ be a two-person game in strategic form, and let c be a c-acceptable correlated strategy in Γ . Denote c{1,2} = c.
By Deﬁnition 7 there exist correlated strategies for i, ci , i = 1,2 such that (c1, c2, c{1,2}) has the following three properties:
Ui(di) Ui(ci) for every di ∈ Δ(Xi), i = 1,2.
For every d ∈ Δ(X) there exists i ∈ {1,2} with Ui(d) Ui(c).
However, the three properties above are precisely the properties that are required to guarantee that c is a strong medi-
ated equilibrium implemented by the minimal mediator (c1, c2, c{1,2}). Therefore, c is a strong mediated equilibrium. 
7. Aggregate deviations
In this section we develop a theory of another type of implementation by mediators, for settings in which players con-
sider deviations with re-distribution of payments, and discuss its relationships with the previous sections. In the following
sections we use the results of this section to prove additional existence theorems for the standard strong mediated equilib-
rium. However, the theory developed here is interesting for its own.
We begin with a fourth notion of strong equilibrium for games in strategic form. Let Γ be a game in strategic form. For





We say that a correlated strategy c is surplus optimal if maxd∈Δ(X) UN (d) is attained at c. Obviously, every surplus opti-
mal correlated strategy is also Pareto optimal. Also, one can always ﬁnd a surplus optimal correlated strategy, which is
concentrated on a pure strategy proﬁle.
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strategy for S , cS ∈ Δ(XS ),
US
(
cS × (×i∈Sc qi)
)
 US (q1 × q2 × · · · × qn).
The requirement that q is a strong equilibrium of type IV seems to be acceptable in an environment in which the players
do not correlate their strategies, and do not redistribute their payoffs, but they may fear/hope that such a correlation and
re-distribution is possible. The following is a simple observation:
Observation 2. Given a game in strategic form, every strong equilibrium of type IV in the game is also a strong equilibrium of type III.
When players consider aggregate deviations as possible, a mediator must make sure that sending him the right messages
forms a strong equilibrium of type IV at the mediated game. We therefore deﬁne:
Deﬁnition 11. Let Γ be a game in strategic form. A correlated strategy c ∈ Δ(X) is an aggregate mediated equilibrium if there
exists a mediator for Γ , M, and a vector of messages m ∈ M, with cN(m) = c, such that m is a strong equilibrium of
type IV in Γ (M). Such a mediator is said to implement c with aggregate deviations.
Lemma 1 and Propositions 1, 2, 3, and 4 are true when “strong equilibrium of type III” is replaced with “strong
equilibrium of type IV”, “strong mediated equilibrium” is replaced with “aggregate mediated equilibrium”, and “strongly
implements” is replaced with “implements with aggregate deviations”. The following is a simple observation:
Observation 3. Every aggregate mediated equilibrium is a strong mediated equilibrium.
Observation 1 also holds for the concept of aggregate mediated equilibrium. Hence, we also deﬁne the aggregate medi-
ated core as follows:
Deﬁnition 12. The aggregate mediated core of Γ , Cag−m(Γ ) is the set of all feasible payoff vectors w, for which there exists
an aggregate mediated equilibrium c such that w= U(c).
We now deﬁne the classical concepts7 of TU -acceptable strategies, and the TU-core, which will be related to aggregate
mediated equilibrium and aggregate mediated core, respectively. However, we deﬁne these concepts in the spirit of previous
deﬁnitions in this paper, rather than in the equivalent classical way, which associates a TU-cooperative game with each game
in strategic form. In the next sub-section we will provide also the classical approach, which is useful.
Deﬁnition 13. Let Γ be a game in strategic form, and let c be a correlated strategy. We say that c is TU-acceptable if there
exists a sequence of correlated strategies (cS)S⊆N with cS ∈ Δ(XS ) and cN = c, such that for every T ⊆ N and for every
dT ∈ Δ(XT ), UT (dT × c−T ) UN (c).
Deﬁnition 14. A payoff vector w = (w1,w2, . . . ,wn) is in the TU-core, Ctu(Γ ), if there exists a TU-acceptable correlated
strategy, c such that w= U(c) = (U1(c), . . . ,Un(c)).
Proposition 7.
1. Every aggregate mediated equilibrium is TU-acceptable.
2. There exists a game Γ , and a TU-acceptable strategy c, which is not an aggregate mediated equilibrium.
3. The aggregate mediated core is contained in the TU-core. That is,
Cag−m(Γ ) ⊆ Ctu(Γ ),
and moreover, there exists a game Γ for which a strict inclusion holds.
Proof. 1. The proof mimics the proof of the analogous claim in Proposition 5.
2. Consider the game in strategic form given in Theorem 1, Γ . It can be easily checked that (c, c, c) is a TU-acceptable
correlated strategy in this game. By Theorem 1, (c, c, c) is not a strong mediated equilibrium in Γ . Therefore, by Observa-
tion 3, (c, c, c) is not an aggregate mediated equilibrium.
3. The proof mimics the proof of Corollary 1. 
7 See [34].
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A TU-cooperative game on the set of players N is a function v : 2N → R with v(∅) = 0, where 2N denotes the set of all
subsets of N .
Let Γ be a game in strategic form. We deﬁne the associated cooperative game vΓ as follows: For every S ⊆ N let




U S (cS , c−S). (9)
Note that:
vΓ (N) = max
c∈Δ(X)
UN (c).
A correlated strategy cS is an optimal punishing strategy for S if it ensures that N/S does not obtain more than vΓ (N/S),
that is the Min in (9) is attained in cS . Note that if c is an optimal punishing strategy for N , then it does not punish any
one. Actually, such c is a surplus optimal strategy.
An alternative deﬁnition of a TU-acceptable strategy is derived from the following observation:
Observation 4. c is TU-acceptable if and only if for every coalition S,
U S (c) vΓ (S).
Consequently, every TU-acceptable strategy c is surplus optimal.
Proof. The proof follows easily from the minimax theorem (see e.g., [34]), according to which:




U S (cS , c−S).  (10)
7.2. Symmetric games with nonempty TU-core
In this section we prove that every symmetric game with a nonempty TU-core possesses an aggregate mediated equi-
librium that yields an optimal surplus. Needless to say that symmetric games are most popular in the rich literature in
the interface between CS/AI and game theory. In particular, much of the extremely rich literature in computer science on
congestion games (see e.g. [2,16,26]) deals with symmetric games, in which agents’ costs do not depend on their identity
and the bundles of resources they can choose from are identical.
We proceed to deﬁne symmetric games: A permutation of the set of players is a one-to-one function π : N → N . We
consider games Γ in strategic form, for which all players share the same strategy set, that is Xi = X j for every i, j ∈ N . Let
us call such games shared-actions games. Let Γ be a shared-actions game. For every permutation π , and for every strategy
proﬁle x ∈ X we denote by πx the permutation of x by π . That is, (πx)π i = xi for every player i ∈ N . Similarly, for a
correlated strategy c and a permutation π we denote by πc the correlated strategy deﬁned by πc(x) = c(πx) for every
x ∈ X. The same notations are applied to strategy proﬁles and correlated strategies in Δ(XS ), S ⊂ N .
A shared-actions game Γ is symmetric if ui(x) = uπ(i)(πx) for every player i, for every action proﬁle x ∈ X, and for every
permutation π .
Obviously, if Γ is a symmetric game, vΓ is a symmetric TU-game, that is vΓ (π(S)) = v(S) for every S ⊆ N and for every
permutation π . Hence vΓ (S) depends only on the number of players in S . Let fΓ : {0,1, . . . ,n} → R be a function with
fΓ (0) = 0 such that vΓ (S) = fΓ (|S|) for every S ⊆ N .
We are about to prove that for symmetric games, Ctu(Γ ) 	= ∅ implies that Cag−m(Γ ) 	= ∅. Moreover we show that there
exists a mediator that implements a symmetric and surplus optimal correlated strategy c with aggregate deviations, that is,
U(c) = ( fΓ (n)n , . . . , fΓ (n)n ).
Before proving this we need the following lemma that characterizes those symmetric games in strategic form that possess
a nonempty TU-core.8
Lemma 2. Let Γ be a symmetric game in strategic form.
(1) If Ctu(Γ ) 	= ∅, then(
fΓ (n)
n




∈ Ctu(Γ ). (11)
8 A suﬃcient condition for the nonemptiness of the TU-core (not necessarily for symmetric games) is given in [36]. This suﬃcient condition does not
imply our condition. Actually, the TU-core is called there the β-core, but the author rightly explains that this is the β-core in the TU spirit.















for every 1 s < n. (12)
Proof. (1) Let w be in the TU-core of Γ , and Let d be a TU-acceptable strategy with UN (d) =w. Because vΓ is a symmetric
TU-cooperative game, by Observation 4, πd is also a TU-acceptable strategy for every π ∈ Π , where Π is the set of all














Let c = 1n!
∑
π∈Π πd. Obviously Ui(c) = fΓ (n)n for every i ∈ N . Therefore, the ﬁrst assertion is proved.
(2) Assume Ctu(Γ ) 	= ∅. By the ﬁrst assertion in this theorem wΓ is in the TU-core. Let c be a TU-acceptable strategy







wΓi  vΓ (S) = fΓ (s).
Therefore, fΓ (s)s 
fΓ (n)
n .
On the other direction, assume condition (12) holds. Let x be a pure strategy proﬁle with uN (x) = vΓ (N) = fΓ (n).
Let c = 1n!
∑
π∈Π πδx . Obviously c is a symmetric surplus optimal correlated strategy, with uN (c) = fΓ (n) because c is
symmetric, Ui(c) = fΓ (n)n for every i ∈ N . Therefore, by condition (12), c satisﬁes the conditions to be a TU-acceptable
strategy. Hence, Ctu(Γ ) 	= ∅. 
Deﬁnition 15. A symmetric game Γ is called balanced if condition (12) holds.
The term “balanced” is inherited from cooperative game theory.9 By Lemma 2, Γ is balanced if and only if its TU-core is
nonempty.










Proof. For every coalition S ⊂ N , let dS be an optimal punishing strategy for S . That is, by using dS the players in S ensure
that the members of N \ S do not get together more than vΓ (N \ S). Obviously, the symmetrization of dS over all permuta-
tions of S is also an optimal punishing strategy for S , which is symmetric in Δ(XS). Let us denote this symmetrization by





cS(πSxS), xS ∈ Δ(XS ),
where s is the number of players in S , and ΠS is the set of permutation of S . Denote cN = c, where c is a symmetric
TU-acceptable strategy with U(c) = wΓ = ( fΓ (n)n , . . . , fΓ (n)n ), whose existence is guaranteed by Lemma 2. We show that the
minimal mediator M = (cS )∅	=S⊆N implements c with aggregate deviations.
Let T ⊂ S , and let ξT ∈ Δ(ZT ) be a potential deviation of the coalition T at the mediated game.
We have to show that ξT is not a proﬁtable deviation for its members. Let ξ = ξT × (×i∈N\T δri ) ∈ Δ(Z). We have to show
that
UMT (ξ) uMT (r1, r2, . . . , rn).
That is,
UT (cξ ) UT (c) = t
n
fΓ (n), (13)
where t = |T |.
9 The deﬁnition of balanced TU-cooperative games is given in [8,29]. By this deﬁnition, a symmetric game Γ is balanced if and only if vΓ is a balanced
TU-cooperative game.




ξ(xS , rSc )cSc (xSc ) =
∑
S⊆T
ξT (xS , rT \S)cSc (xSc ). (14)
Therefore,














ξT (xS , rT \S)
(
US (xS , cSc ) + UT \S(xS , cSc )
)]
. (16)
Because cSc is symmetric for the members of Sc ,
UT \S (xS , cSc ) = t − s








US (xS , cSc ) + UT \S (xS , cSc ) t − s
n − s vΓ (N) +
n − t
n − s U S (xS , cSc ). (18)
Because cSc is an optimal punishing strategy for Sc ,
US (xS , cSc ) vΓ (S).
Therefore, because vΓ (N) = fΓ (n) and vΓ (S) = fΓ (s),
US (xS , cSc ) + UT \S (xS , cSc ) t − s
n − s fΓ (n) +
n − t
n − s fΓ (s).






US (xS , cSc ) + UT \S (xS , cSc )
[
t − s
n − sn +
n − t












ξT (xS , rT \S)
]
= 1
to get the desired inequality in (13). 
8. Existence: Balanced symmetric games in strategic form
In this section we prove our next existence result for strong mediated equilibrium.










Proof. By Proposition 8 there exists a symmetric aggregate mediated equilibrium that satisﬁes (21). By Proposition 3, this
aggregate mediated equilibrium is a strong mediated equilibrium. 
If a symmetric game is not balanced, it does not necessarily possess a strong mediated equilibrium. Indeed In [4],
Aumann presented a symmetric game that does not have a c-acceptable correlated strategy. Therefore, by Proposition 5
Aumann’s game does not have a strong mediated equilibrium.
Consequently, one may conjecture that being a balanced symmetric game is also a necessary condition for the existence
of strong mediated equilibrium.
As we show in the next example this conjecture does not hold. In this example, we construct a non-balanced symmetric
game, which possesses a strong mediated equilibrium. Moreover, this equilibrium will also be surplus optimal. Hence, the
set of symmetric games that possess strong mediated equilibrium strictly contains the set of symmetric balanced games.
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are called locations. A player gets a payoff of 1 if she is alone at one of the locations. Otherwise she gets nothing, i.e., her
payoff is 0. Obviously fΓ (3) = 1; It is obtained when one player is alone. Also, fΓ (1) = 0, because two players can punish
the third one by choosing distinct locations. On the other hand, when two players are choosing distinct locations, they
ensure a total (sum of) payoffs of 1. Hence, fΓ (2) = 1. Therefore, fΓ (2)2 > fΓ (3)3 . Hence, Γ is not balanced. We construct a
minimal mediator that will strongly implement the correlated strategy c, which is deﬁned as follows: c = η{1,2} ×η3, where











Therefore c is surplus optimal. We continue in constructing the punishing parts in the mediator. If a pair of players come
to the mediator, the mediator plays for them some pure strategy in which each of them chooses a different location. If only
one player, i goes to the mediator, he plays for him ci = ( 12 , 12 ). It is easily veriﬁed that no coalition T has a proﬁtable
deviation at the mediated game.
9. K -strong mediated equilibrium
For every “strong” equilibrium concept, and for every 1 k  n one can deﬁne the corresponding concept of a k-strong
equilibrium, in which it is only required that deviation of every subset with at most k players is not proﬁtable. Obviously, a
1-strong equilibrium concept is just a Nash equilibrium, as emphasized in the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 16. A 1-mediated equilibrium is called a mediated equilibrium. That is, a correlated strategy is a mediated equi-
librium in a game in strategic form, Γ , if there exists a mediator for Γ , M, and a vector of messages m ∈ M = ×i∈NMi ,
with cN (m) = c, such that m is pure-strategy equilibrium proﬁle in the mediated game, Γ (M); such a mediator is said to
implement c.
An n-strong equilibrium concept is simply the corresponding strong equilibrium concept. The notion of k-strong equilib-
rium is very natural; it captures the idea that only a group of a limited size can coordinate a deviation.
Before we prove our main result we need the following lemma:






Proof. One can easily generates a direct proof. However, by [5], vΓ is super-additive with respect to the grand coalition.
That is, If ∅ 	= S j ⊆ N , 1 j m is a partition of N to nonempty subsets. Then
m∑
j=1
vΓ (S j) vΓ (N). (23)
Because s divides n, one can take such a partition with m = ns , and with |S j | = s for every 1 j  ns . Therefore, (22) follows
from (23). 
We are now able to prove:
Theorem 4. Let Γ be a symmetric game in strategic form. Let 1 k n be an integer. If k! divides n there exists a symmetric k-strong
mediated equilibrium, leading to an optimal surplus.
Proof. Consider the minimal mediator constructed in proof of Proposition 8. Let 1 s  k, and let S be a coalition with s
members. We have to show that S does not have a proﬁtable deviation. One can notice that when proving this result in
Proposition 8, the only place in the proof , in which we used the fact that Γ is balanced is in deriving the inequality (19).
By Lemma 3 this inequality is satisﬁed by our game too. Therefore, the result follows. 
Notice that this result implies, for example, that in every symmetric game with even number of agents, a 2-strong
mediated equilibrium always exists. Moreover, there is such an equilibrium, in which the agents’ sum of payoffs (that is,
their social surplus) is maximized. Hence, optimal social surplus can be obtained using a mediator, where deviations by
pairs of players are not beneﬁcial.
We believe that this result has quite signiﬁcant ramiﬁcations from the CS/AI perspective. In the recent years much
attention has been given to the study of game-theoretic solution concepts in computerized settings (see [10,22] for some
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by pairs, are not handled. By introducing the study of mediators, a natural concept in many of the systems discussed in that
literature, we are able to obtain real general positive results; for example, if one considers a router in a standard symmetric
congestion setting then this router can obtain stability against deviations by singletons and pairs for arbitrary cost functions,
when acting as a mediator.
We have already mentioned the example in [4], which we use to show that a non-balanced symmetric game does
not necessarily possess a strong mediated equilibrium. This example can be modiﬁed to an example in which k! does
not divide n, and the game does not have a k-strong mediated equilibrium. On the other hand, Example 3 shows a non-
balanced symmetric game, and a k (k = 2) such that k! does not divide n (n = 3), in which there exists a k-strong symmetric
equilibrium.
10. Program equilibrium: A special type of mediators
The theory of mediators discussed in this paper is a very broad one. Indeed, in general, the agents’ messages can be
arbitrary, and the interpretation of these messages can be arbitrary. One interesting type of messages are those that have
the ﬂavor of a standard computer program, using a standard programming language; in this case it is interesting to look at
mediators whose role is the mere execution of the programs. As shown in [32] this perspective can be highly productive.
We now brieﬂy discuss program equilibrium and its relationships to our setting.
Consider the prisoners dilemma, discussed in the introduction. Denote the possible actions by D (defect) and C (co-
operate). Recall that in the only (dominant strategy) equilibrium of this game both agents will choose D , while mutual
cooperation will lead both of the agents to a higher payoff. In [32] this issue has been addressed by considering agents
who can use computer programs as their strategies; these computer programs are to run on a single server/machine, and
therefore can exploit the famous dual role of computer programs (introduced in [35]): a program can serve both as a set of
instructions and as a data ﬁle. Consider the program: IF MY-PROGRAM = YOUR-PROGRAM then C; else D; The exact syntax
and semantics of such programs is discussed in [32], but the reader can easily notice the basic idea: the agent/programmer
instructs the computer to compare its program to the other program, as ﬁles, and execute a particular action based on the
result of that comparison. There are no circular arguments here, due to the dual role of computer programs. Moreover, this
program deﬁnes a program equilibrium: it is irrational for an agent to deviate from that program assuming the other agent
stick to it. As a result, we get cooperation in the one-shot prisoners’ dilemma! This result is then extended to a general folk
theorem.
An interesting question is whether the role of a mediator can be replaced by a computer program as discussed in [32].
We conjecture:
Conjecture 1. Given a game in strategic form, the set of outcomes implemented by the program equilibria of the game is equivalent to
the set of outcomes implemented by the mediated equilibria of that game.
11. Discussion
Mediators make perfect sense in the CS/AI setting/literature where the idea of providing agents with protocols and sug-
gestions is typically considered. This is in contrast to most work in economic theory. This paper concentrated on establishing
the theory, putting it in the perspective of foundational work in game theory, and proving the usefulness of mediators in
establishing behaviors which are stable against group deviations, a signiﬁcant challenge in multi-agent systems.
Notice that the design of mediators can be viewed as the design of mechanisms for a given game; the mediators do not
design new games from scratch, or constrain the agents’ behavior in the given game. This is complementary to the literature
on mechanism design, which became quite standard in CS/AI (see e.g. [22,24,28]) where games are designed from scratch
in order to obtain some desired criteria. The design of mechanisms that lead to desired behavior in a given game is also
the subject of work on social laws for artiﬁcial agent societies (e.g. [20,30]); however, social laws do constrain the agents’
behaviors in the given game.
Finally, an interesting recent line of research deals with the desire to distribute the power of some limited forms of
a mediators using alternative cryptographic techniques (see e.g., [1]). It is interesting to note that equipping agents with
programs, as discussed in Section 10, can be also viewed as an approach for distributing the power of mediators.
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